Non-counterfeitable document system

ABSTRACT

A system for authenticating an object on the basis of certain physical phenomena or character, specifically, measurable, but not practicably duplicable random variations in the object. In one form, the object (authenticator (T)) is a paper tag having a reference space (14), the varying translucency pattern or which is a measurable but practicably unduplicable characteristic of the paper. The reference space (14) is sensed to provide reference signals indicative of the varying translucency. A reference numeral (10) is then provided from some registered form, as on the tag or in a list. If the numeral (10) is readily accessible, it likely will be cryptographically encoded. Note the value of putting encoded information on the tag to avoid the need for large reference files. 
     For verification, freshly sensed reference signals, as from the tag (T) (actually characteristic of the tag) are compared with signals that previously were sensed as characteristic of the tag (T). Structures are disclosed as specific forms of the authenticator (T), along the apparatus for authenticator production, detection and manipulation. Different forms of tags (210) are disclosed, the measurable characteristic of which involves light transmissivity and reflectivity. Apparatus (111) for spectrographic confirmation of tag material is also disclosed. In an illustrative form of a tag (T) as an identification means, tags and processing apparatus utilize magnetic medium (218) and printed images (214). The magnetic medium is also disclosed to be recorded as for developing information on shelf life and sales channels.

RELATED SUBJECT MATTER

This is a divisional of application Ser. No. 623,654, filed June 22,1984, now U.S. Pat. No. 4,546,352 which is in turn a divisional ofapplication Ser. No. 492,324, filed June 3, 1983, now U.S. Pat. No.4,489,318, which is in turn a divisional of application Ser. No.276,282, filed June 22, 1981, now U.S. Pat. No. 4,423,415, which is inturn a continuation-in-part of Ser. No. 161,838 filed June 23, 1980, andentitled "Non-Counterfeitable Document System", now abandoned

BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

A growing need exists for a practical system of identification for usein various specific applications to segregate counterfeits, imitationsor fakes from genuine articles. Regarding commercial products, severalindicators suggest that ever increasing numbers of fakes are appearingin a wide variety of different merchandise lines. The piracy of recordedmaterial, e.g. phonograph records, audio tapes, and video tapes, hasbeen a recognized problem for some time. However, the practice ofmarketing fakes now has grown to encompass many other products.Successful products bearing prestigious trademarks are copied in detailfor fraudulent sales. Unfortunately, although legal remedies often existto curtail the sales of such counterfeits, detection and enforcementoften is difficult and expensive. To compound the problem, many fakescannot be readily detected without careful study or inspection by aprofessional. In view of the various difficulties and the existingconditions, a considerable need exists for an economical, practicalsystem to verify or authenticate genuine articles both in the interestsof preserving trademark or brand integrity and protecting the publicfrom fraudulent copies.

In the past, a wide variety of techniques have been used for trying todistinguish genuine articles from fakes. For example, finely printedlabels have been used in the hope that counterfeiters could not makeduplicates. However, present highly developed reproduction technologyenables the duplication of very complex graphics with relatively littledifficulty.

Individual serial numbers or other identifications have also beenapplied to products for the purpose of authentication. Yet, failingeither complete cooperation from sales people, or a comprehensivedetection and policing program, such techniques afford little protectionagainst copies. As a result of such difficulties, product pirates havebeen relatively free to pick and choose from a current group ofsuccessful products that could be copied, the fakes to be sold on aglobal scale with relative impunity.

In addition to commercial products, authentication is important in avariety of other applications as for commercial paper, identificationcards, documents of value, and so on. As disclosed herein, the system ofthe present invention may be variously implemented to authenticate awide range of subjects, including people.

The present invention is based on recognizing that an effective systemof authentication can utilize a device with an obscure randomcharacteristic. The system also recognizes that objects with suchcharacteristics are readily available so that authentication deviceshereof can be produced and used inexpensively, enabling selectiveinvestigation. For example, a producer can provide his full line ofproducts with an authenticator, then limit policing activities to eithersample groups or those select, very successful products that are mostlikely to be copied.

In operation, the present system employs select physical phenomena thatcharacterize objects. Each phenomenon is measurable, but not practicablyduplicable. Consider an example. The pattern of translucency variationin a sheet of ordinary bond paper may be seen by exposing the sheet toback lighting. That complex and random pattern of varying translucencyis measurable but not practicably duplicable. Of course, such a randomlyoccurring pattern can be altered, for example, as by adding printing;however, the random character of the non-printed portion of the mediumcannot be duplicated by a practicable effort. The present invention isbased upon utilizing such a medium having such a measurable but notpracticably duplicable characteristic for identification. Note that thecharacteristic being considered occurs randomly in nature, or in theproduction of a medium (without control) to provide a basis foridentification data. such a randomly occurring characteristic isdistinct from the operation of printing or otherwise designating amedium with a randomly generated numeral or similar data. It is theinherent random character of production or nature in a medium that ismeasurable but substantially unduplicable.

To consider another example, random variations in the naturallyresulting reflectivity of a medium may be used as a measurable, but notpracticably duplicable characteristic.

The medium may, for example, comprise: part of a product, part of a tagattached to a product, part of an identification device, part of adocument of value, and so on. As a further aspect of the presentdiscovery, the system may be implemented so that only a portion of themedium is utilized, and the location of that select portion is preservedin secrecy along with the measured characteristic

In accordance with one technique of the present invention, a referencemedium is sensed or measured to provide electrical reference signalsrepresentative of the select random pattern that is characteristic ofthe medium, but not practicably duplicable in a similar medium.Confirmation of that specific medium then involves another sensing ofthe medium and a comparison with the results of the original sensing.

In one exemplary application, reference signals identifying a patternand its location are cryptographically encoded and recorded on themedium to provide a self-contained tag. Pursuing such an example in moredetail, assume that the physical medium of the authenticators comprisesbond paper. A defined area of each sheet of paper has a specifiedpattern of selected locations. Based on the characteristic of thatpattern (and its location), reference signals are generated to beencoded and associated with the sheet, e.g. printed or otherwiserecorded, as on the sheet. To authenticate such a sheet, the system ofthe present invention senses it to again detect or measure the selectedpattern of authentication signals. The fresh signals are then comparedto the recorded reference signals previously developed from the pattern.Coincidence of the signals indicates the sheet to be genuine.

As disclosed in detail below, the system hereof may be variouslyimplemented using different media and techniques. For example, thelocation of the random pattern of concern may be visually obscure andcan be crytographically encoded by a computer apparatus. Also, thecharacteristic reference signals can be variously stored for futurecomparisons. Some or all of such signals might be kept on a list, orcryptographically encoded and recorded, in memory, or optically ormagnetically on the authenticator media.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

In the drawings, which constitute a part of this specification,exemplary embodiments of the invention are set forth as follows:

FIG. 1 is a perspective view of an authenticator tag according to thepresent invention illustrated for use in association with a product;

FIG. 2 is a fragmentary sectional view taken through the tag of FIG. 1;

FIG. 3 is an enlarged fragmentary view of the tag of FIG. 1 illustratingthe measurable but not practicably duplicable variation in its physicalcharacteristic;

FIG. 4 is a graphic presentation illustrating signals modulated torepresent variations in a measurable but not practicably duplicablecharacteristic;

FIG. 5 is a diagrammatic view illustrative of an array or afield-of-locations format for the tag of FIG. 1;

FIG. 6 is a diagrammatic view illustrating a detailed array format forspecifying a pattern in the tag of FIG. 1;

FIG. 7 is a block diagram of a tag production system in accordance withthe present invention;

FIG. 8 is a block diagram of a tag authentication system in accordancewith the present invention;

FIG. 9 is a schematic diagram of an authentication system illustrated insubstantial detail;

FIG. 10 is a block diagram of an exemplary form of a component in thesystem of FIG. 9;

FIG. 11 is a plan view of an identification card of the presentinvention implemented for use in accordance with the present invention;

FIGS. 12, 13, and 14 are sectional views taken through the card of FIG.11, respectively along lines 12--12, 13--13, and 14--14.

FIG. 15 is a fragmentary diagrammatic view of a recording format on thecard of FIG. 11;

FIG. 16 is a block diagram of a system for utilizing the card of FIG.11;

FIG. 17 is a diagrammatic view of a component of the system of FIG. 16.

FIG. 18 is a schematic view of a system in accordance with the presentinvention for continuous production of tags; and

FIG. 19 is a fragmentary plan view of a document of the presentinvention incorporating authentication means.

DESCRIPTION OF THE ILLUSTRATIVE EMBODIMENTS

As indicated above, detailed illustrative embodiments of the presentinvention are disclosed herein. However, physical identification media,data formats, and operating systems structured in accordance with thepresent invention may be embodied in a wide variety of forms, some ofwhich may be quite different from those of the disclosed embodiments.Consequently, the specific structural and functional details disclosedherein are merely representative; yet in that regard, they are deemed toafford the best embodiment for purposes of disclosure and to provide abasis for the claims herein which define the scope of the presentinvention.

Referring initially to FIG. 1, a shoe S is fragmentarily representedalong with an authenticator tag T which is securely attached to the shoeby a cord C. The tag T carries a legend in the form of a referencenumber 10 which may be duplicated in the shoe, e.g. number 12. Ingeneral, the system of the present invention enables authentication ofthe tag T to verify that the shoe S is a genuine article. First, the tagT is identified with the shoe S by the similar numbers 10 and 12.However, more significantly, the number 10 indicates and specifies ameasurable but not practicably duplicable physical characteristic of thetag T. Specifically, in a space 14 (generally designated on the tag T) afield of locations (array of squares) is defined (not actually marked indetail) which has a characteristic measurable, but not practicablyduplicable pattern of variations in translucency. The location of thatpattern and its form are defined by a representative number that iscryptographically related to the identical numbers 10 and 12. That is, apattern of locations in the space 14 and their translucency are codedinto the reference number 10.

It is to be realized that the tag T (if authentic) verifies the genuinenature of the particular shoe S only because the identification numbers10 and 12 coincide. For an alternative more direct authentication, themedium of the space 14 may be integrated in the actual product that isto be identified, or other codes can be employed. For example, in thecase of art work, e.g., signed graphic prints, a marginal area of thesheet of paper bearing the print may serve to provide the pattern ofmeasurable but not duplicable random variations. For other products,other characteristics can be utilized. However, note that a specific tagT may be employed only to identify a single article. That is, while thetag T might be affixed to a fake duplicate of the shoe S, such a switchto the counterfeit shoe would leave the genuine shoe S without anauthenticator thereby presumably reducing its value.

In alternative implementations, the tag T might be completely blank orcould carry only an indication of the coded locations. In suchimplementations, the pattern locations could be uniform and theinformation on the characteristic pattern could be kept on an inventoryor list of specific products or objects. Comparing a freshly sensedcharacteristic pattern with the recorded characteristic pattern wouldthen authenticate a product. Such implementations could be desirable foritems of limited production or large monetary value, e.g., graphic artprints.

To pursue the illustrative tag T in somewhat greater detail, the space14 simply appears as a blank area that is located by a corner indicia16. Several predetermined small secret areas (perhaps different on eachauthenticator tag) in the space 14 have measured translucencies. Such aset of translucency values is coded in the reference number 10. That is,the encoded number 10 indicates the locations of the small secret areasand their translucency values. The number 10 also includes certainmiscellaneous data, e.g. coding data, a date, codes used, a productserial or batch number, and so on.

In addition to the reference number 10 and the corner indicia 16, thetag T usually will also carry a trademark or other identificationindicia 18. Note also that the space 14 may be enhanced as disclosedbelow with printing, to visually appear as an image, design or patternso long as the measurable but not duplicable characteristic (random inthe manufacture) is preserved.

Considering the physical form of the tag T in somewhat greater detail,it may be desirable to include protective laminate layers. Specifically,as illustrated in FIG. 2, the tag T comprises a sheet 20 of bond paperlaminated between a pair of protective clear layers 22 and 24. A durableand stable tag T with a plane reference surface is the result.

In sensing the tag T, only predetermined specific small areas are ofinterest. Locating such areas involves first locating the space 14,defining the field of locations therein, then finding the specificlocations of interest. The corner indicia 16 locates the space 14 and isshown substantially enlarged in FIG. 3. Just inside the corner of theindicia 16, areas 26 are represented to suggest the varying translucencyof the paper in the tag T. Specifically, the area 26a is represented tocontain a considerable quantity of somewhat opaque fiber with theconsequence that it would produce a low numerical indication oftranslucency, e.g. perhaps "one" or "two" on a scale of "zero" through"nine". On the contrary, the area 26b is indicated to be relativelyclear of light-obstructing fibers or particles and as a consequencewould be relatively translucent, perhaps producing a representativevalue of "eight" or "nine". The values produced from the other definedareas in the space 14 would lie in the range of these extremes.

As indicated above, the small-area translucency characteristic ismeasurable but not duplicable in a commercially practicable way, as aresult of its small and complex pattern form. Generally, the measurablebut not duplicable pattern will also be characterized as being random.As indicated above, the random character occurs in the growth,development or manufacture of the medium and is not simply random dataimposed on the medium. With respect to the illustrative example of lighttranslucency, the phenomenon occurs commonly in fibrous material, as inbond paper. Various phenomena (other than translucency) may be observed,as for example reflectivity or other characteristics that will modulateenergy for sensing in the form of an electrical signal.

One technique for sensing the areas 26 of the tag T involves scanning aline or row of the areas 26 continuously to produce an analog signalthat can then be sampled at periodic intervals. Specifically, for oneheavy paper, a scansion of translucency along a row of the areas 26resulted in an analog signal as represented in FIG. 4a. Subsequently,another scansion taken along the same row of areas 26 resulted in ananalog signal as illustrated in FIG. 4b. Thus, it may be seen that thevalues are repeatable so that a record of the curve of FIG. 4a may bechecked with the curve of FIG. 4b (recently sensed) to verify theidentification of the medium. As suggested above, the actual comparisonmay involve digitized samples of the signals at discrete intervals.Detailed forms of such comparison means are disclosed below.

Returning to pursue the explanation of the tag T (FIG. 1) reference willnow be made to FIG. 5 to consider the field of locations defined forselecting specific locations or areas of the space 14. Within the space14, a field or array 28 of squares 29 is to be specified in relation tothe corner indicia 16. Specific areas then are selected in the array 28.The specific areas within the array 28 could also be of non-squareshape, such as rectangular, circular, or other suitable geometry

As represented in FIG. 5, the location of the array 28 is displaced fromthe corner indicia 16 by an offset distance (varying for differentauthenticators) indicated by a line 30. The location of the array 28 inrelation to the corner indicia 16 is specified by one decimal digit ofthe reference number 10.

The array 28 defines a matrix or grid of nine hundred and sixty of theindividual squares 29. Specifically, the array 28 (FIG. 5) is twentysquares from top 31 to bottom 33 and forty-eight squares from left edge35 to right edge 37. Consequently, the grid contains nine hundred andsixty squares 29 which are numerically designated square "000" to square"959". Again, it is to be understood that neither the array 28 nor theindividual squares are visually indicated on the tag T in any manner.Rather, their format and their precise locations are defined in relationto the indicia 16 by the reference number 10 and the operating format ofthe system. Essentially, time and motion relationships are used tolocate the spaces.

Considering the format of the squares 29 within the array 28 in greaterdetail, the array 28 is divided into eight separate rectangular sectorsas graphically illustrated in FIG. 6. Specifically, the sectors A, B, C,D, A', B', C', and D' occupy the array 28 in a rectangular pattern, andeach sector contains one hundred and twenty of the squares 29 (FIG. 5).The squares within each of the sectors (FIG. 6) are also in arectangular pattern and are designated as follows:

    ______________________________________                                               Sector                                                                              Squares 29                                                       ______________________________________                                               A     000-119                                                                 B     120-239                                                                 C     240-359                                                                 D     360-479                                                                 A'    600-719                                                                 B'    480-599                                                                 C'    840-959                                                                 D'    720-839                                                          ______________________________________                                    

According to a disclosed format, the code or reference identificationfor each tag T is derived from the array 28 (FIG. 5) by selecting onesquare from each of six of the sectors A, B, C, D, A', B', C', or D'(FIG. 6). The measurable but not duplicable characteristic observed inthe physical medium of the tag T at each of the selected squares 29(FIG. 5) provides a representative signal on a scale from zero to nine.In the embodiment as disclosed in detail below, six such representativesignals are developed as a characteristic code to identify the tag T.With such a characteristic code, test apparatus can verify the tag. Inone disclosed embodiment, as will now be considered in detail, the sixdecimal digits of the characteristic code are embodied in the decimalreference number 10 (FIG. 1) which is printed on the tag T. The specificdata format of the printed reference number is as follows:

    ______________________________________                                                   Decimal                                                            Data       Digits   Name      Function                                        ______________________________________                                        shift digit                                                                              1        word SD   indicates length                                                              of offset line                                                                30 to locate                                                                  array 28,                                                                     FIG. 5                                          address    9        word AN   identifies se-                                                                lected pattern                                                                of squares 29                                                                 in array 28                                     characteristic                                                                           6        word CC   represents trans-                               code                          lucency of selected                                                           squares 29                                      identification                                                                           10       word IW   carries miscel-                                 data - optional               laneous data as                                                               date, etc.                                      ______________________________________                                    

The reference number 10 (FIG. 1) in a format in accordance with theabove table is used in a signal represented form, identified as a codeword PN. It is to be apppreciated that the first sixteen digits (decodedword DW including words SD, AN, and CC above) are cryptographicallycoded into a code word designated CW. Consequently, the code word CW maynot identify directly with the digits of the decoded word DW, althoughthe data of each include: one digit indicative of the offset or locationof the array 28, nine digits which indicate the six predeterminedlocations or addresses of the selected squares in the array pattern, andsix digits indicative of the translucency at the selected squares.

The coded word CW (sixteen digits) is supplemented by an additional tendigits (word IW) to complete the data of the code word PN. For ease ofexplanation, decimal digits will be used in the following explanations,recognizing that implementations may be in a form of binary-codeddecimal or pure binary codes.

Recapitulating to some extent, the code word PN is developed on thebasis of randomly selected location data and measurements of the tag T.The selected data measures the offset of the array 28 (FIG. 5) and thelocations of the specific squares 29 therein that are to be used tospecify the characteristic. The measurements of those squares 29 providesix additional digits (word CC).

The word PN is completed with miscellaneous data as indicated above andreduced to the form of the reference number 10 which is printed on theauthenticator tag T. The tag T is then available for authentication toverify the likelihood that an associated product is genuine withoutreference to other memory. Thus, it is not necessary in thisimplementation to store inventories of tag characteristic data separatefrom the tags themselves.

In the authentication or test operation, the authentication system ofthis embodiment cryptographically decodes a portion of number 10 (codeword CW) to provide the decoded word DW. That word indicates: theprecise location of the observed pattern of squares 29 in the array 28(FIG. 5) and the digits indicative of the previously observed value ofthe physical characteristic at each of such individual squares.

After determining the location pattern of the select squares 29, thesystem senses the physical characteristic values of the squares in theform of decimal digits (code word CC') which are then compared with theoriginally sensed data word CC, six decimal digits. As disclosed indetail below, the comparisons are performed in a manner to allow sometolerance for situations in which the tag T may have been damaged orchanged with age. Also, various other techniques can be used in thatregard, as to set a scale based on a current measurement or observation.

In the event that a tag T is fraudulently duplicated simply bymechanical copying, statistical considerations indicate that thecharacteristic code word CC (contained in the reference word PN) willnot even approximate the code word CC' sensed as the characteristic ofthe tag T, e.g. the translucency of several predetermined squares on thetag T. Consequently, the counterfeit is detected.

The format employed in the embodiment under consideration for specifyingcertain of the squares 29 will now be considered. Although the formatcoding may appear to be quite unusual, as will become apparent, theformat may enable verification of an authenticator, even though it hasbeen damaged.

As indicated above, the array 28 (FIG. 5) is divided into eight sectors(FIG. 6), each of which is in turn subdivided into one hundred twentysquares 29. Also as indicated above, the system encodes theauthenticator tag T by sensing six predetermined squares 29 from thearray 28 of nine hundred and sixty squares. Those six select squares 29provide six decimal digits. Note that the six decimal digits are takenfrom six different sectors and are addressed by nine decimal digits.Such addressing is accomplished by obtaining (randomly or selectively)the addresses for three squares (nine decimal digits) in the sectors A,B, C, or D then mathematically deriving related addresses for thesectors A', B', C', or D'. Thus, in case of damage to an authenticator,addresses often can be derived from remaining valid data.

The sector A contains a uniform sub-array (ten by twelve) of one hundredand twenty of the squares 29 designated or addressed by the numerals 000through 119. Consequently, a three-digit decimal number from 000 through119 (inclusive) designates a specific square in sector A. Byincrementing the address by 600 the same numerical address alsodesignates a particular square in sector A' (sequence 600-719). As aspecific example, the number 075 designates a specific square in thesector A and as a related value, the number 675 designates a square insector A'.

Just as squares specified in sector A are incremented by 600 to specifysquares in sector A', similar addressing is used for the other sectors.Square designations in sector B are incremented by 360 to obtain anaddress for designating a square in sector B'. Addresses designatingsquares in sector C are incremented by 600 to designate squares insector C'. Finally, addresses for squares in sector D are incremented by360 to be translated into addresses for squares in the sector D'. Usingsuch a format, an address word of nine decimal digits indicates sixsquares in the array 28. Thus, nine decimal digits indicate threesquares in three of the four sectors A, B, C, or D and three squaressimilarly in three of the four sectors A', B', C', or D'.

Continuing with the explanation of the format in the array 28 (FIG. 5)of squares 29, the division or partitioning as suggested above isregular and uniform. That is, the squares 29 in each sector lie in arectangular array of rows and columns. Specifically, for example, theright-most column (vertical) of sector A (FIG. 6) contains squaresaddressed by the numerals zero through nine. Such a format is used tosubdivide each of the sectors of the array 28. As will be explained ingreater detail below, the array 28 is sensed or observed by a bank oftwenty miniature photoelectric cells which are aligned with thecoinciding rows in pairs of side-by-side sectors. Thus, for example, thesquares 29 of the sectors A and B are read together as the bank of cellsrelatively scans across the space 28. If using an authenticator made ofstandard data processing card stock, squares of one-tenth of an inch areeffective with a tolerance to fifteen thousandths of an inch.

As each square in the array 28 (FIG. 5) is observed or sensed, itstranslucency results in an analog value which is quantized into one often discrete levels, i.e. zero through nine. From such data, six digitsare developed from six selected squares that are identified herein bothin the form of a numerical value and a signal by the designations U, V,W, X, Y, and Z. These and other signal and data designations used inrelation to the present embodiment are summarized for convenientreference in the following alphabetical list:

    ______________________________________                                                                     Decimal Digits                                   Designation                                                                           Description          (or Binary)                                      ______________________________________                                        AN      Address word portion of DW                                                                         9                                                AU      Authentication signal                                                                              binary                                           C       Clock signal         binary                                           CC      Characteristic code word                                                                           6                                                        (recorded)                                                            CC'     Characteristic code word                                                                           6                                                        (sensed)                                                              CN      Code number portion of DW                                                                          6                                                CW      Coded word portion of code                                                                         16                                                       word PN                                                               DW      Decoded form of CW   16                                               IW      Identification word portion of                                                                     10                                                       word PN                                                               PN      Code word (reference number on                                                                     26                                                       authenticator)                                                        SD      Shift digit of DW    1                                                ta      Timing signal        binary                                           tb      Timing signal        binary                                           tc      Timing signal        binary                                           td      Timing signal        binary                                           t1      Time signal - read PN                                                                              binary                                           t2      Time signal - decode CW                                                                            binary                                           t3      Time signal - position                                                                             binary                                                   authenticator array                                                   t4      Time signal - read array for CC                                                                    binary                                           t5      Time signal - compile                                                                              binary                                           t6      Time signal - compare CC values                                                                    binary                                           t7      Time signal - display                                                                              binary                                           U       Decimal digit of CC or CC'                                                                         1                                                V       Decimal digit of CC or CC'                                                                         1                                                W       Decimal digit of CC or CC'                                                                         1                                                X       Decimal digit of CC or CC'                                                                         1                                                Y       Decimal digit of CC or CC'                                                                         1                                                Z       Decimal digit of CC or CC'                                                                         1                                                ______________________________________                                    

In view of the above introductory explanations, the structural aspectsof the initial detailed embodiment can now be pursued effectively ingreater detail. First, explanation will be of an apparatus (FIG. 7) forgenerating the reference numbers, e.g. identification number 10 whichequates to the code number PN (encoding). Next, an embodiment isconsidered with reference to FIG. 8 for explaining an operation ofverifying an authenticator (decoding) and testing. Thereafter, othersystems are treated, explaining various components and operating aspectsin substantially greater detail.

Referring to FIG. 7, a random code generator 50 provides code wordswhich are screened or verified as specifying appropriate offset andaddress. The code generator 50 provides signals representative of thenine-digit word AN to a register 52 along with a single digit SD,indicative of the offset of the array 28 from the corner indicia 16(FIG. 5). This operation occurs during a period indicated by a timingsignal ta as represented in FIG. 7. Note that the binary timing signalta, along with similar subsequent timing signals tb and tc can beprovided by various digital structures, as a counter. Also, therepresentative number of decimal digits for registers in the system ofFIG. 7 are indicated in parentheses at each register.

During an interval after registering the word AN, the timing signal tbsees the offset digit SD applied to an MBND (measurable but notpracticably duplicable) physical characteristic sensor 54 along with theaddress word AN. During that time, the sensor 54 receives anauthenticator, e.g. tag T, and under the command of the representativesignals SD and AN locates six squares 29 on the tag T at whichtranslucency is sensed to provide the six-digit characteristic code wordCC. It is to be noted that as indicated above, an alternative toselective sensing would be to sense or read the entire array 28 toprovide an analog signal, then selectively gate portions of that signalas related by time and space to the select six squares 29.

Continuing with the present example, the digits of the code word CC(representing degrees of translucency at the six selected squares 29)are represented by six decimal digits designated U, V, W, X, Y, and Z.These digits along with the offset digit SD and the address word AN areplaced in a register 56 during the interval of the timing signal tc.

A variety of cryptographic encoders are well known in the prior art andmay be employed in embodiments of the present invention. As illustratedin FIG. 7, a form of crvptographic encoder 58 receives the contents ofthe register 56 (sixteen digits of the word DW) for cryptographicencoding to provide the coded word CW for the printed reference number10. The digits of the word CW are supplied to a register 60 which alsoreceives the miscellaneous data portion or code word IW from a register62. In that fashion, the register 60 receives the reference number PNwhich, in one operating format, is imprinted on the tag T (FIG. 1).

The register 60 may incorporate a readout device for providing thereference number 10 (representative of word PN). Alternatively, thesignals representative of the number may be employed to drive any of avariety of printing mechanisms to imprint the identification number onthe tag authenticators T. If desired, as indicated above, theidentification number may also be placed on the article or product forsale (number 12, FIG. 1).

In an another arrangement, the PN register 60 may be connected to amagnetic recorder 64 for recording the number PN on the authenticator itidentifies, the authenticator incorporating a magnetic recording surfaceas disclosed in detail below. A system of continuous operation forproducing complete authenticators also is described below.

After an authenticator, e.g. tag T (FIG. 1) is associated with anarticle, e.g. the shoe S, in due course the occasion may arise to verifythe authenticity. In general, verification is performed by reading thenumber 10 (word PN) and decoding it to obtain: (1) the locations ofsquares 29 in the space 14 which are to be sensed (word AN) and (2) thevalues of the characteristic expected to be sensed at the indicatedsquares (word CC). With such information, the array 28 is defined (FIG.5) then the identified squares (FIG. 6) are sensed. The resulting freshnumerical observations (word CC') then are compared with the similarprevious recorded observations (word CC) to confirm authenticity.

Assuming an exemplary operation of the disclosed embodiment to validatea tag T, reference will now be made to FIG. 8 for an explanation. Thetag T (FIG. 1) is placed in an authenticator holder 66 which isassociated with a numerical input device 68 and a sensor 70. The device68 inputs the reference number 10 (FIG. 1--twenty-six digits) providingrepresentative electrical signals for that number. In a specificembodiment of the system, the device 68 may comprise any of a widevariety of structures ranging from a manual key-operated apparatus to anumerical optical reader. If the reference number 10 is in the form of abar code, the device 68 may be a wand or other type of bar-code scanningdevice, such as those employing laser scanning, as known in the art. Inusing an authenticator as described in detail below to include amagnetic recording surface, the input device 68 includes a magneticstripe reader. In any event, the device 68 functions during an intervaldesignated by an initial binary timing signal ta to load a register 72with a code word PN representative of the number 10 (FIG. 1).

Signal representations from the register 72 (comprising the code wordCW) are applied to a cryptographic decoder 74 which functions during aninterval of a timing signal tb to develop the decoded word DW, signalrepresentations for which are placed in a register 76 during theinterval of the timing signal tc.

Recapitulating, the sixteen digits of the word DW are allocated asfollows: the first digit SD designates the offset (line 30, FIG. 5); thefollowing nine digits, designated word AN, specify the addresses of thesquares 29 to be sensed; and the last six digits, word CC, specify thecharacteristic code and comprise the digits U, V, W, X, Y, and Z.

During a time interval defined by a signal td, the sensor 70 receivessignals representative of the digit SD along with the signal representedword AN. As described above, the signals specify six squares 29 of theauthenticator. At such locations, the tag T is sensed to provide signalsrepresentative of six decimal digits U', V', W', X', Y', and Z' asindicated above. The signals representative of such digits (word CC')are supplied from the sensor 70 to a comparator 78 which also receivessignals representative of the corresponding digits U, V, W, X, Y, and Z(word CC) from the register 76. That is, during the interval of thesignal td, the comparator 78 receives the code word CC which was carriedin the identification number PN, concurrently with the freshly sensedcode word CC'.

The comparator 78 provides signals to indicate the degree of coincidencebetween those two code words. Specifically, the comparator 78 supplies asignal to a display apparatus 80 which may indicate any one of thenumerals: "0", "1", "2", and "3". Exhibition of the numeral "0"indicates no significant degree of comparison thereby designating thetag T as a fraud. Display of the numeral "1" indicates a small degree ofcoincidence, e.g. two of the six digits may compare. In a relatedfashion, the display of numeral "2" indicates a greater degree ofcomparison, and the numeral "3" indicates full coincidence. Thus, theobserver is afforded with an indication of the degree of coincidence;and in that regard, some latitude may be tolerable or desirable as partof an acceptable authentication. As indicated above, the display 80 mayalso manifest various data as the product batch number or even aspecific product number. In that manner, the system of the presentinvention is useful in detecting diversion of products as well as thecounterfeiting of products.

From the above description, it may be seen that the system of thepresent invention affords an authenticator that cannot be productioncopied in a commercially practical device. The cryptographic code mayrange from being a relatively simple one, requiring only manualdecoding, to a complex one requiring computer decoding with a randomlygenerated computer key stored in the computer, and unknown to any livingperson.

Considering various degrees of comparison which may be sensed asdisclosed in the system of FIG. 8, the material of the authenticator andits environment may permit use to a standard of complete coincidence.However, with regard to other products, considerable tolerance may beadvisable to allow for damage to a portion of the authenticator. In thatregard, tests on various fibrous materials including paper tag or labelstock indicate a wide variety of media that meet the requirement ofbeing repeatably scannable, preservable, and unique with regard to thetranslucency patterns discussed above.

Using the authenticator format as disclosed with reference to FIGS. 5and 6, it is noteworthy that a three-digit comparison may beaccomplished by using either half of the tag. That is, as the digits U,V, and W are derived from three of the four sectors A, B, C, or D andthe digits X, Y, and Z are derived from three of the four sectors A',B', C', and D', one set of three values may be obtained upon ignoringeither half of the authenticator as shown in FIG. 6. If the lower halfof the array 28 is ignored, the sectors A', B, C', and D remain intact.If the right half of the array 28 should be lost, the sectors A, B, C,and D remain intact; and so on. Such a philosophy is incorporated in theembodiment of FIG. 9 which processes authenticators having a format asdescribed above. In describing the system of FIG. 9, reference is madeto data formulated of decimal digits for ease of explanation andcomprehension. However, it is to be understood that in accordance withwidespread practice, such data may well be reduced to a binary-decimalformat or operation might well utilize a purely binary system of values.

The system of FIG. 9 is illustrated for use with an authenticator 102(upper right) in the form of a tag or card as described above. Theauthenticator 102 is sensed or scanned while it is moved by a mechanicalapparatus incorporated in a transport and pulse generator 104.Specifically, the generator 104 is connected as illustrated to rollerpairs 106 and 108 which move the authenticator 102 from right to left inrelation to devices for dynamic sensing. Traveling from the roller pair106 through the roller pair 108, the authenticator 102 passes throughfour sensors or readers. Specifically, the authenticator 102 firstpasses under an optical reader 110 which senses the reference number 10from the authenticator in the form of the word PN comprising twenty-sixdecimal digits. With the sensing of the number 10, the authenticatormoves under a sensor 109 for a light analyzer 111. The analyzer teststhe authenticator 102 spectrographically, to indicate material foreignto that of which the authenticators are made.

Next, the authenticator moves under a line sensor 112 that detects thecorner indicia 16 (FIG. 1). The line sensor 112 senses the point fromwhich clock pulses are counted for determining the offset. Theauthenticator 102 is then moved under the characteristic translucencysensor 114 for scanning. It is to be noted that zero offset could alwaysbe used, as in a continuous motion system of operation.

As suggested above, the characteristic sensor 114 incorporates a bank116 of miniature photoelectric cells that are illuminated by an opposedlight source 118. It is perhaps noteworthy that tests with various mediaindicate that in certain instances it may be desirable to use coloredlight (narrow spectrum bands). Specifically, blue light was found to bevery effective for sensing the translucency of certain card stocks.Furthermore, the translucency of some card stocks or paper media mayvary in spectral response to the point that colored light may be used toinvoke another test element. That is, for example, a record oftranslucency measurements at one or more specified locations, using twoor more different light sources for each location can provide anothercriterion in the verification of the authenticator.

As the authenticator 102 passes between the bank 116 and the lightsource 118, it is scanned along twenty parallel rows, to provide twentysignals, each of which is representative of the translucency (perhapswith regard to light of a specific color) of a row of squares defined onthe authenticator 102.

The characteristic sensor 114 provides the analog translucency signalsto output lines 120 which are connected to signal processors 122 foramplifying and refining the individual analog signals before applicationto a series of selector gates 124. Functionally, the gates 124 passdiscrete samples of the observed analog signals which are representativeof the selected squares 29 defined on the authenticator 102. The gates124 are controlled by address information and clock signals C asdescribed in greater detail below. However, it should be noted that thecard transport and pulse generator 104 supplies timing signals and clocksignals to the gates 124 indicative of the instant position of theauthenticator 102 as it moves under the characteristic sensor 114.

To obtain the address data (AN and SD) signals are processed from theoptical reader 110. Specifically, signals from the reader 110representative of the code word PN (identification number 10) are firstset in the register 126 for further processing.

One portion of the word PN, i.e. the cryptographically encoded word CW,comprises the first sixteen digits of the word PN. The remaining portionof the word PN (word IW consisting of ten digits) is notcryptographically encoded and simply indicates miscellaneous informationor data, e.g. the date of encoding, an identification of thecryptographic encoding technique used, product information, and thelike. Signals representative of the code word IW are supplied from theregister 126 to a display unit 128 for direct display illustrated as"data" in FIG. 8.

The cryptographically encoded word CW is supplied from the register 126to a cryptographic decoder 130. As a result, the sixteen coded digitsare decoded to provide the code word DW which is then set in a register132 (center right). The word DW consists of three parts, specifically:(1) the digit SD indicating the shift or offset of the array 28 from thecorner indicia 16 (FIG. 1); (2) the address information word AN forlocating the predetermined squares; and (3) the translucency data wordCC for the translucency of the preselected squares.

The six-digit word CC is conveyed by signals from the register 132 to acompiler 134. In the compiler 134, the six individual digits of thereference word CC are compiled into the various possible combinations ofthree decimal digits. Specifically, the compiler 134 formulates thefollowing combinations of the reference digits for comparison, thecoincidence of any one of which with freshly sensed information affordsan indication that the authenticator 102 is genuine; specifically:

U, V, W

X, V, W

U, Y, W

X, Y, W

U, V, Z

X, V, Z

U, Y, Z

X, Y, Z.

Generally, as described in detail below, the individual combinations ofdigits as indicated above are represented for both the freshly sensed(data CC') and the record signals (data CC). These are applied to asequencer system as generally designated by the numeral 136. Recall thatthe freshly sensed signals are shown primed to distinguish them from thecorresponding recorded reference signals. The development of the freshlysensed signals for the word CC' will now be considered.

As indicated above, the analog signals, each representative of singlescanning lines along a row of squares in the array 28 (FIG. 5) aresupplied through the electrical lines 120 (FIG. 9, upper left) and thesignal processors 122 to the selector gates 124. Two control signals(clock and gating) are provided to the gates 124 to pass selectedsamples of the analog signals during six discrete intervals. Such analogsignal samples are selected by the address word AN and indicate thetranslucency of the six predetermined squares in the array 28 of theauthenticator 102.

The address word AN is manifest by signals that are supplied from theregister 132 (central right) to a decoding matrix 140 for thedevelopment of control signals that are in turn applied to the gates124. The nine decimal digits of the word AN, include three, three-digitnumbers to indicate directly three squares or addresses in three of thefour sectors A, B, C, or D (FIG. 6). That is, the three, three-digitnumbers of the word AN specify a specific row and column for each of thethree locations as explained with reference to FIG. 6. Additionally, asexplained above, the three numbers also specify specific rows andcolumns in the sectors A', B', C', or D'. Thus, the nine decimal digitsare decoded to specify six squares or locations in the array 28 whichare to be sensed for translucency.

Each of the selected squares 29 is selected on the basis of its row andcolumn. The designation of a specific row designates a specific one ofthe lines 120. The designation of a specific column specifies a preciseperiod of time during the read process (related to the position of theauthenticator 102) which is a sampling interval indicated by timing orclocking signals provided from the transport and generator 104.

To consider an example, assume that a designated square in sector B(FIG. 6) lies in the fifth row and the sixth column (conventionalorientation, counting down and right). As a consequence, an indicationof the translucency value of the square would be contained in the analogsignal of the fifth line in the series of lines 120. The specific sampleor slice of that signal would occur when the sixth column is beingscanned. Consequently, the selector gates 124 would be qualified bydecoded gating signals from the matrix 140 and the generator 104 to passa sample of the fifth line at the sixth scanning period which wouldindicate the translucency of the specified square.

In view of the possibility that two squares may be concurrentlyobserved, two lines or conductors 142 are provided to carry such signalsto an analog-digital converter 144. For example, samples could occursimultaneously from adjacent sectors.

The analog signal samples supplied to the converter 144 are translatedinto a digital format and supplied through cables 146 to a bufferstorage unit 148. In that manner, the freshly sensed code word CC' isdeveloped in a decimal digital format consisting of the digits U', V',W', X', Y', and Z'. Those digital signals are supplied from the unit 148to a register 150 from which signals are supplied to a compiler 152 thatis generally similar to the compiler 134. Consequently, the freshlyobserved translucency code word CC' is developed in the compiler 152while the previously observed (and recorded) reference translucency codeword CC is developed in the compiler 134.

The signals from the compilers 152 and 134 are sequenced for comparisonthrough the sequencer 136 from which they are applied to a comparator154. That is, the sequencer 136 incorporates a control 156 whichadvances a pair of contacts 158 and 160 to synchronously receive thedeveloped composite values of U, V, W, X, Y, and Z. Although anelectromechanical equivalent form of the sequencer system 136 isillustrated for simplicity, it is understood that the apparatus willnormally be embodied in the form of solid state electronics as wellknown.

As the moving contacts 158 and 160 of the sequencer pass along theopposed pairs of stationary contacts in the sets 162 and 164,respectively, signals representative of similar combinations of U, V, W,X, Y, and Z are supplied in synchronism to the comparator 154. Ofcourse, any of a variety of standards may be imposed; however, theoccurrence of a single coincidence among the eight comparisons ofcomposite values (depicted in FIG. 9) can generally be expected toindicate the authenticator 102 to be genuine. Operating on such a basis,the comparator 154 incorporates a flip-flop (not shown) which is set inthe event of any identical comparisons. Subsequently, that flip-flopproduces a signal to illuminate an indicator "OK" of the read-out unit128. Other coincidences are redundant in such operation. As statedabove, the display unit 128 also provides a date and other "data"relating to the authenticator 102.

In view of the above structural description of the system of FIG. 9, acomplete understanding may now be perfected by explaining a sequence ofoperation from the time a card or authenticator 102 is placed in thesystem until a positive or negative indication is exhibited.Consequently, assume that the authenticator 102 is provided to theroller pair 106 with the result that the roller pair is automaticallyactuated and driven by the transport and generator 104 to advance theauthenticator under the optical reader 110. At that instant, thetransport and generator 104 is actuated to initiate a timing signal t1,which is one of a series to sequence the operation of the system.

The timing signal t1 is applied to the optical reader 110, the lightanalyzer 111 and the line sensor 112. As a result, the reference number10 (FIG. 1) is read to provide signals indicative of the word PN whichis registered in the PN register 126. Almost concurrently, the sensor109 and the light analyzer 111 provides a spectrographic indication,sensing the character of the material of the authenticator 102. Ofcourse, various degrees of sophistication can be employed in theanalyzer 111. If the analyzer 111 determines that the material of theauthenticator 102 is improper, a rejection lamp 111A is illuminatedindicating negatively on the basis of the spectographic test. Of course,various trace elements or compounds can be incorporated in the materialof the authenticator 102 for simplifying this operation as related tothe total system.

After the reference number 10 (FIG. 1) has been sensed, theauthenticator 102 (FIG. 9) continues to move until the line sensor 112detects that the corner indicia (FIG. 1) is critically positioned, i.e.in the preparatory position. At that instant, the transport andgenerator 104 stops the authenticator 102, terminating the initialoperating interval designated by a high state for the timing signal t1and initiating the interval of the timing signal t2.

Note that the optical reader 110, the light analyzer 111, the linesensor 112, and the register 126 are each operative during the intervalof timing signal t1. After that time, the authenticator 102 is held in apreparatory position pending the time of the binary signal t2 beinghigh, while the word PN is decoded by the decoder 130 to specify theoffset as illustrated by the line 30 in FIG. 5. Also, part of thedecoded word AN specifies the squares of interest with data which inturn selects the appropriate signal from the lines 120 and samplingtimes thereof to provide the correct translucency signals.

That portion of the word PN which is carried in the sixteen digitsdesignated as word CW is processed by the cryptographic decoder 130 toproduce the decoded word DW which is set in the register 132. A portionof that word, i.e. the digit SD, indicates the offset of line 30 (FIG.5) and is applied through a digital decoder 133 to the transport andpulse generator 104. Essentially, the single decimal digit SD manifeststhe predetermined amount of offset. Accordingly, the digit SD is decodedand used by the transport and pulse generator 104 to advance theauthenticator 102 a small distance, proportional to the numerical valueof the digit SD.

Considering the extremes, a value of "nine" for the digit SD will causethe offset of line 30 (FIG. 4) to be the length of a square; however, adecimal digit SD with a value of "zero" will indicate no offset.

After sufficient time for the decoder 130 to operate, the timing signalt2 yields to the timing signal t3. Note that all of the timing signalsare supplied from the generator 104; however, to preserve the drawinglegible, connection lines are not shown.

The counting of clock pulses determines the initial offset to locate thepoint where reading begins and that initial operation occurs during thetiming signal t3. At the conclusion of the timing signal t3, theauthenticator 102 is aligned with the characteristic sensor 114preparatory to the simultaneous or parallel scanning of the rows in thearray 28 (FIG. 5). That operation is performed during the timing signalt4 and occurs as the authenticator 102 moves under the bank 116 ofsensors. As a result, analog signals indicative of varying translucencyalong each of the rows of squares are provided through the lines 120 andthe signal processors 122 to be selectively gated to pass six samples tothe converter 144. From those analog samples the converter 144 providessix sets of decimal signals to the buffer storage 148 and then to theregister 150. The timing interval of signal t4 then yields to signal t5.

During the interval of the timing signal t5, the compiler 152manipulates the digital values as indicated in various combinations ofU', V', W', X', Y', and Z'. At the conclusion of the interval indicatedby the signal t5, the compilers 152 and 134 each contain a set ofcombination values. Note that the compiler 134 operates during theperiod of the timing signal t4.

During the interval of the timing signal t6, the sequencer 136 isoperative to sequentially compare the individual combination values fromthe compilers 134 and 152. In the event of a coincidence at any stage ofthe comparison, the display 128 is commanded to indicate "OK" at thetime of signal t7 manifesting the genuine nature of the authenticator102. Of course, in the event that no comparison occurs, then thecomparator 154 provides a negation signal indicating no authentication.The display 128 supplies a reset signal to the comparator during theinterval of timing signal t7.

It should be understood that the final comparison of prerecorded andfreshly sensed values may be done visually by the operator, rather thanelectronically as above described. Such visual comparison has theadvantage of allowing the system some margin for error. For example, theoperator could be instructed to consider a fresh reading within plus orminus one to be a match with a prerecorded value. For this reason,"comparator means" and the like phrases herein (including the claims)should be understood to embrace ordinary registers or displaysassociated with the authentication equipment, which can be visuallyobserved by the operator.

Thus, it may be seen that systems in accordance with the presentinvention may be variously embodied to produce an authenticator thensubsequently sense the authenticator on the basis of random, measurablebut not duplicable physical media in order to verify the authenticator.

In an alternative implementation, deemed suitable for small productionarticles, the characteristic codes of authenticators may be registeredin computer memory for test verification. Specifically, an authenticator(paper for example) could be measured or sensed to provide acharacteristic code word for a product. The code word would then beplaced on a list to be scanned for verifying an authenticatoraccompanying the product. Various other implementations will beapparent, including forms where part or all of the code word is carriedwith the product and can be obscured as disclosed in detail above, bycryptographic encoding. The pattern of predetermined squares may also bepreserved in secrecy as disclosed in the above detailed embodiment. Ofcourse, various forms of energy, record medium and so on may be employedin the system. In addition to paper, certain forms of card stock alsohave been found to be appropriate as being repeatably scannable,preservable and unique. As suggested above, spectral response variationsmay also be used for further assurance against counterfeits.

Various techniques may be employed to accomplish a statisticallysatisfactory comparison between fresh and recorded data. In that regard,it may be desirable to pre-sense a tag to set a scale for sensedsignals. As another technique, a sample of the sensed or observed valuesmay be used as a standard which determines the range of other values.Such a technique might be employed in systems where the authenticatormight change significantly but fairly uniformly with age or exposure toan anticipated environment. Also, in certain applications it may beappropriate to variously scale or stretch the observed signals dependingupon the range of observed amplitude both in the encoding and decodingoperations on the authenticator 102. For example, considering thedecoding operation, if the signals detected by the characteristic sensor114 are sensed in a narrow range, the signal processors may vary theoperating range of the amplifiers (by stretching and clamping) so as toobtain a greater spread or range for the individual signals as wellknown in the art. In that manner, signal distinction and classificationis accommodated. Of course, the range adjustment may be accomplished ata digital level as well as an analog level; however, for purposes ofillustration, reference will now be made to FIG. 10 showing a structurewhich may be incorporated in the signal processors 122 (FIG. 9) toaccomplish the variable amplification and to indicate a card that isunreadable. Such an unreadable authenticator might be an opaquecounterfeit or a genuine card that has been smudged or otherwise ruined.

The output lines 120 (FIG. 9) from the characteristic sensor 114 areconnected to signal processors 122 which as illustrated in FIG. 10 mayinclude a plurality of individual amplifiers 201. As indicated, theoutput from each of the amplifiers 201 is applied to a black-outdetector 204 and a range detector circuit 203. The detector 204 sensesthe occurrence of a substantial number of "black" or low level signaloutputs indicating a departure from the format standard. The detector203 provides an output range signal indicative of the extreme signalsreceived from the amplifiers 201. Thus, fading or other changes in theauthenticator are somewhat compensated, as well as equipment variations.

The range detector 203 may involve the operation of differentialamplifiers to provide a signal which is applied to an amplifier rangecontrol circuit 205. Note that both the circuit 203 and the amplifiercontrol 205 are timed to operate during the interval of t3 which affordsa preliminary operating interval of the characteristic sensor 114 (FIG.9) to sense a section of the authenticator that is in advance of thespace 28 (FIG. 5). In essence, in the embodiment the authenticator 18 isobserved to obtain an indication of the range of variations intranslucency. Then, depending upon the observed range, the amplificationof the representative signals is accommodated to a desired scale ofamplification by the amplifiers 201 (FIG. 10).

The amplifier range control 205 supplies a signal to each of theamplifiers 201 to shift the scale of amplification. Essentially, theamplifiers 201 are nonlinearly responsive to the signal from the control205, operating on different portions of an amplification curve toaccommodate signal range. An example will illustrate the operation.

In the event that the spread or differential between signals received inthe range detector circuit 203 is large, a relatively high signal levelis applied to the amplifier range control 205 which consequentlyprovides a relatively low control signal to each of the amplifiers 201causing them to operate with relatively linear amplification. On thecontrary, if the spread or differential manifest by the signals receivedin the range detector circuit 203 during the interval of the signal t3is small, a relatively small output signal is provided from the circuit203 to the control 205. As a result, a somewhat larger signal is appliedfrom the control 205 to each of the amplifiers 201 causing theamplifiers to operate nonlinearly and thereby increasing the spread orrange of the observed signals.

The amplifier range control circuit 205 is set during the interval ofthe signal t3 and maintains a predetermined control signal for theoperation of the amplifiers 201 throughout a sensing operation.Thereafter, during the interval of the signal t7, the control 205 iscleared preparatory to a subsequent cycle of operation.

Also operating with the amplifiers 201, the black-out detector senses asituation in which a significant portion of the authenticator hasminimal or essentially very low translucency. The situation could occurwhen an authenticator card is dirty or smudged, or as a result oftampering or with the use of a counterfeit card. In such an event, thevery low levels of translucency will result in very low levels for thesignals in the lines 120. The coincidence of a predetermined number oflow-level signals in the lines 120 is sensed by the detector 204 toilluminate a lamp 204A. Such an event informs an operator that the testmay be impossible because of various possibilities as indicated above.Specifically, the illumination of the lamp 204A informs the operatorthat a card should be carefully inspected in spite of indications by thesystem, e.g. the authenticator may be a counterfeit or may have beenchanged to be incapable of verification.

From the above, it will be apparent that the system of the presentinvention may be variously implemented to utilize a wide variety ofdifferent components and structures to accommodate the basic philosophyof operation wherein measurable but not practicably duplicable randomvariations in physical media are employed to verify authenticity. As anexample of such alternatives, the system of the present invention can beeffectively used to implement a reliable identification card asillustrated in FIG. 11 and which will now be considered in detail.

The card 210 is a laminate article incorporating a basic sheet, e.g.bond paper 215 (see FIGS. 11, 12 and 13), along with certain other mediafor verification indications.

Considering the format of the card 210 (FIG. 11), assume for examplethat it is adapted for use as a form of personal identification. Ofcourse, certain of the aspects as disclosed herein may be readilyadopted for use in a wide variety of documents including passports,valuable paper, authenticators, and so on.

In the illustrative form, the card 210 carries print 212 (upper left)indicating the name of the assigned holder along with a photographiclikeness 214 (right). The print 212 and the likeness 214 may bevariously deposited or printed on a sheet of bond paper 215 (FIG. 12).Generally, the print 212 and the likeness 214 alter the translucency ofthe bond paper 215 in certain specific areas. In general, overlays,erasures or other modifications of the print 212 or the likeness 214will tend to further alter the translucency of the paper 215 at pointsof alteration.

In general, in accordance herewith the translucency of predeterminedareas involving the print 212 or the likeness 214 is sensed and providedas a record for authenticating the card 210. Sensing and recordingoperations may be as explained above. However, in an alternativearrangement, indications of the translucency (or various other randomcharacteristics, measurable but not practically duplicable) are carriedon the card in a form that is not generally humanly readable.Specifically, in the authenticator embodiment of FIG. 11, theverification confirmation information is recorded on a magnetic stripe216 which may also provide various other information.

In the present embodiment, the magnetic stripe 216 incorporates a clocktrack which not only indexes another magnetic track of the stripe 216but additionally indexes non-magnetic areas of the card 210 for criticalcharacteristic observations. The characteristic observations includetranslucency. Additionally, the card 210 incorporates a stripe or band218 for indicating still another characteristic. Specifically, the band218 provides dimensional reflectivity variations as a characteristicimposing an exceedingly severe burden for any effort at duplication.

The card 210 might be carried by the assigned holder for identification.An initial confirmation of the holder could be made simply by comparingthe likeness 214 on the card with the holder's physical appearance.Confirmation of the card 210 and the absence of modification would thenbe checked by an apparatus constructed in accordance with the presentinvention as described in detail below. Generally, checking is performedby scanning the card horizontally along several paths. Specifically, thecard 210 is scanned for translucency readings along paths 220 and 222(translucency tracks 1 and 2) for characteristic data indicative of thebond paper 215 in composite with the print 212 or the likeness 214.Additionally, the card 210 is scanned along the magnetic stripe 216 toobtain confirmatory data. The data from the magnetic stripe designatesselected locations along the paths 220 and 222 for translucencyobservations. The data may also indicate the values of priorobservations as well as personal identification data for a subject orholder and data on the extent or limits of use of the card.

The structure of the card 210 includes means for a further confirmationof the authenticity, and is therefore adapted for exceedingly highreliability. Specifically, the card 210 incorporates a band 218(reflectivity stripe) in the form of a layer of foil 224 (FIG. 14)carrying sand-like particles 226. The observed characteristic of theband 218 involves light reflectivity at particular locations. Dataindicative of such characteristics are confirmed by apparatus somewhatsimilar to that employed for confirming the propriety of thetranslucency observation as mentioned above.

Considering the structural form of the card 210 in somewhat greaterdetail, the full area of the card is occupied by the bond paper 215(FIGS. 11, 12 and 13) and a pair of external clear plastic sheetlaminates 228 and 230.

In addition to sealing the bond sheet 215, the laminates 228 and 230also enclose the magnetic stripe 216 and the reflectivity band 218. Ingeneral, techniques for the production of laminate identification cardsincorporating stripes, e.g., magnetic stripes, are well known.

Turning now to the data format of the card 210 of FIG. 11, the magneticstripe 216 involves two recording tracks as well known in the prior art.Of course, additional tracks (also as well known) may be incorporated inalternative embodiments. One of the magnetic recording tracks is adedicated clock track while the other track carries the following data:the locations of select characteristic areas along the paths 220 and222; location data for the reflectivity stripe or band 218; values ofthe characteristics at the specified locations; and optional dataincluding personal identification numbers, account numbers, use records,and so on.

To pursue a specific example of a card format, assume that datalocations D1 and D2 (indicated by "X") are assigned in the translucencytrack 1 (path 220) and locations D3 and D4 (similarly indicated) areassigned in the translucency track 2 (path 222). Again, these locationsare indicated by an "X" symbol on the drawing.

Further, assume that data locations D5 and D6 are assigned in thereflectivity band 218. Accordingly, the preliminary processing of thecard would involve sensing the characteristic translucency at datalocations D1, D2, D3, and D4 and the reflectivity at locations D5 andD6. Data indicating the locations (encoded if desired) along with theobserved values of translucency and reflectivity is encoded on themagnetic stripe 216.

To verify a card, a preliminary visual observation might be madeconcerning the likeness 214 and the identification of the print 212. Ifsuch indicators appear satisfactory, machine verification may be pursuedto indicate the possibility of either a counterfeit card or an alteredcard. Specifically, the measurable but not substantially duplicablecharacteristics at locations D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, and D6 are sensed andcompared with the data registered from a prior sensing of suchlocations. If the card 210 has been modified (as in the likeness 214) oris a forgery, on a statistical basis, it is exceedingly unlikely thatthe comparative standard will be attained. For even further confirmationregarding the propriety of the card holder, a personal identificationnumber test, may be incorporated in the magnetic stripe 216 as wellknown in the prior art.

Prior to considering the system for processing the illustrative card210, a preliminary consideration of the recording format on the magneticstripe 216 will be helpful. Reference now will be to FIG. 15. Theinitial portion of the magnetic stripe 216 is dedicated to initializingthe operation in cooperation with a magnetic card reader. Accordingly,an initializing section 232 occupies the leading edge of the stripe(left as illustrated). Beyond the initializing section 232, the lowerportion of the stripe 216 records clock signals CS in a track 234 whilethe upper portion records data in a track 236.

In the described embodiment, the first section 238 of the data track 236specifies the data locations D1-D6 of interest for the card. Followingthe section 238 (left to right) in the data track 236 is a section 240for recording the data characters, i.e. the characteristics sensed atthe locations D1-D6. In the operation of the system, the data in themagentic location 238 and the clock track 234 locate the points orlocations D1-D6 for sensing. The characteristics observed at such pointsor locations on the card 210 are then compared with recorded datacharacters provided from the section 240 which were recorded at the timeof the initial sensing. Of course, on any selected basis of criteria, asexplained above, the comparison will either indicate the card'sauthenticity a failure of confirmation. Consideration will now bedirected to the structure of FIG. 16 which performs the test asgenerally indicated above.

A card reader 250 (top left) may take any of a variety of forms forsensing the data as described above from the card 210 (FIG. 11).Specifically, the card reader 250 incorporates: (1) apparatus forsensing translucency along the paths 220 and 222, (2) structure forreading the magnetic stripe 218 as well known in the prior art, (3)apparatus for sensing reflectivity along the band 218, and (4) ananalog-to-digital converter to convert observed analog translucency andreflectivity readings to a digital format. A form of reflectivitysensing apparatus is disclosed in detail below. The card 210 may beautomatically moved through the card reader 250 as explained with regardto the authenticator 102 in the system depicted in FIG. 8.Alternatively, the card reader 250 may be a manually operated sensingdevice wherein a person simply pushes the card 210 through an elongateslot. A form of the latter device for sensing a magnetic stripe isdisclosed in U.S. Pat. No. 3,914,789, Cocker, Jr. et al.

The outputs from the card reader 250 include: signals D and CSrepresentative of data and clock signals from the magnetic stripe 216(carried on lines 252 and 254); data representative of the translucencyalong paths 220 and 222 (carried in lines 256 and 258); and areflectivity signal sensed along the band 218 (carried in line 260).

The clock signals CS (line 254) are applied to a control unit 262 fordeveloping refined clock signals C. The clock signals C are supplied toeach of the functional components of the system; however, in theinterest of simplification, connection lines are not illustrated.

The operating sequence of the system of FIG. 16 is controlled andregulated by timing signals t1-t4 from the control unit 262 along withthe clock signals C. The timing signals t1-t4 are developed by thecontrol unit 262, using the clock signals C and the data signals D.

After the initializing operation, the binary timing signal t1 is appliedto a card data register 264. Under the control of the signals t1 and C,the register 264 receives the record from the data track 236 (FIG. 15).Of course, the magnetic data stripe information may vary as suggestedabove; however, the portion thereof pertinent to the embodiment of FIG.16 is utilized to specify the locations D1-D6 and the characteristicmeasurements at such locations. The data locations from the section 238(FIG. 15) are specified by signals applied from the register 264 to thecontrol unit 262 during timing signal t2.

Some decoding may be performed on the data location signals as disclosedabove with regard to earlier embodiments; however, depending upon theformat employed, any of a variety of specific signals may be suppliedfrom the control unit 262 during the interval of binary timing signalt2, to specify the data locations D1-D6.

Signals representative of the locations D1 and D2 (for path 220) areprovided from the control unit 262 to a register 266. Somewhatsimilarly, location signals for the recording path 222 are placed in aregister 268 and location signals for the reflectivity band 218 areprovided in a register 270. As a consequence, after the transfer duringthe interval of timing signal t2, the register 266 contains two valuesto indicate the locations D1 and D2 of the translucency track 1, i.e.,path 220. Somewhat similarly, the register 268 contains valuesindicative of the locations D3 and D4 on the translucency track 2, i.e.,path 222. Finally, the register 270 holds values representative of thelocations D5 and D6 along the reflectivity band 218.

In essence, the values from the registers 266, 268, and 270 are testedagainst the accumulated values in a clock pulse counter 272 to indicatethe instants when the locations D1-D6 are being sensed to therebycommand selection of the current values detected from the sensing as theselected data characters.

The instant position of the card 210 (as it is sensed in the card reader250) is manifest by a location counter 272 which receives clock pulsesduring the timing interval of the signal t3. Essentially, the tally oraccumulated count in the counter 272 indicates the relative displacementof a card 210 in the card reader 250, thereby indicating the position ofthe sensing apparatus with respect to the locations D1-D6.

The accumulated count value from the location counter 272 is applied todigital coincidence detectors 274, 276, and 278 which also receivetiming signals t3 and signal-represented values from the registers 266,268, and 270. Upon detecting a coincidence between received sets ofsignals, each detector 274, 276, and 278 provides the high level of abinary output signal to qualify a gate indicating that a criticallocation (D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, or D6) is currently being sensed and therepresentative signal is to be gated for consideration.

Output signals from the detectors 274, 276, and 278 are connectedrespectively to "and" gates 280, 282, and 284. The "and" gates 280 and282 receive the translucency signals in lines 256 and 258 respectivelyand are qualified at the critical point in time (space) to supply theobserved values at the locations D1, D2, D3, and D4 (see FIG. 11). The"and" gate 284 receives the reflected signal value and is qualified atthe instants for observation of locations D5 and D6.

The signals manifesting observations from the locations D1-D6 aresupplied from the "and" gates 280, 282, and 284 to a comparator 288which is also connected to receive signals from the register 264representative of the data characters from section 240 (FIG. 15) of themagnetic stripe 218.

As described above, the comparator 288 receives six signal-representedvalues digitally representative of prior observations of the selectcharacteristics at locations D1-D6 from the register 264. The comparator288 also receives fresh data of the same nature from a current sensingof the card 210 through the gates 280, 282, and 284. The comparator 288then compares the two sets of data (recorded and fresh) in accordancewith a predetermined logic pattern and utilizes the comparison on astatistical basis for indicating the authenticity of the card inquestion as described in detail above. Of course, the authenticator 288may utilize a variety of comparative techniques some of which have beenexplained above with respect to prior embodiments of the presentinvention. If a card 210 in question is resolved to be authentic orgenuine, then a lamp 290 on the comparator is illuminated. Alternately,the comparing means may simply comprise two displays or registers withthe operator then making a visual observation of the degree ofcoincidence between freshly sensed and prerecorded values.

To consider a specific examplary operation of the system of FIG. 15,assume the existence of a card 210 precisely as illustrated in FIG. 11with the data locations D1-D6 sensed and appropriately recorded on themagnetic stripe 216 along with other specific data. Further assume thatthe card 210, so recorded, is presented for authentication by anapparatus constructed in accordance with FIG. 16. By way of example,assume the following relative characteristic values exist at the datalocations:

D1: 3

D2: 7

D3: 2

D4: 5

D5: 1

D6: 6.

With the movement of the assumed card 210 through the card reader 250,it is scanned from left to right (as illustrated) so that sensors passover each of the horizontal sections of interest. At the outset of suchscanning, the magnetic stripe 216 is sensed for an initializingoperation in the control unit 262 as well known in the prior art forsynchronizing the sensed clock signals CS with respect to the productionof the timing clock signal C. After the brief initializing period, theclock pulses C are provided with space-related regularity throughout thebalance of the card scanning operation.

After initializing, data is sensed by the card reader from the magnetictrack 236 (FIG. 15). Specifically, values are provided from the firstsection 238 which specify the locations D1-D6 as by a numerical count ofdisplacement along the card. Such data, along with the characteristicdata from the track 236 is set in the card data register 264.

The control unit 262 receives the signal-represented data locations fromthe register 264, performs processing operations, and during theinterval of the timing signal t2 sets the registers 266, 268, and 270with two values each (in this example), which are independently suppliedto the detectors 274, 276, and 278 during the interval of the timingsignal t3. Specifically, the register 266 is set with values which aremeasured from a timing mark on the magnetic stripe 218 to initiate theinterval of timing signal t3. Essentially, the data locations in theregister 266 indicate the number of clock signals CS which lie in ahorizontal path and offset the locations D1 and D2 from the starting ortiming mark. Similar signal-represented values are set in the register268 for the locations D3 and D4 as well as in the register 270 for thelocations D5 and D6.

During the interval of operation (t3) the data values in each of theregisters 266, 268, and 270 are continually compared with theincrementing number in the counter 272. That is, the counter 272 isactuated to count clock pulses C from the control unit 262 from thebeginning of the timing signal t3. Thus, during the interval of thetiming signal t3, the counter 272 specifies horizontal offsets for thelocations D1-D6, which may be used according to the card format.

When the counter 272 attains a number equal to the horizontal offset foreach of the locations D1-D6, one of the detectors 274, 276, or 278signifies such an occurrence by qualifying one of the gates 280, 282, or284 with the result that the observed analog signal (translucency orreflectivity sample) is gated to the comparator 288 perhaps to representvalues of:

D1: 3

D2: 8

D3: 2

D4: 5

D5: 2

D6: 6

At the conclusion of the scanning of the card 210, currently sensedcharacteristic values (3, 8, 2, 5, 2, 6) from the locations D1-D6 areregistered in the comparator 288. Also, the data from the magneticstripe section 240 (D1-D6) are also registered in the comparator, i.e.,3, 7, 2, 5, 1, 6. During the interval t4, the two sets of data arecompared for a degree of coincidence. Normally, any significant degreeof coincidence between the freshly observed data and the previouslyobserved data from the magnetic stripe will indicate that the card 210is genuine and authentic. The small differences indicated in theexemplary data would likely be acceptable in most applications. However,in documents as the card 210, a higher degree of coincidence may bedemanded to avoid acceptance of a modified document. In that regard, anychange in the print 212 (FIG. 11) or the likeness 214 would likely bemanifest by significant differences in the signals observed versus thesignals recorded regarding the locations D1, D2, and D4.

While the above system selects the desired signals by direct gating, itwill be apparent to those skilled in the art that an entire scanning ofdata could be sensed, sampled and converted as a basis for selectivecomparisons. Also, many different kinds of comparison techniques mightwell be employed, as for example amplitude ordering and mathematicalmanipulation and range comparisons, e.g., sum of squares comparisons.

The translucency sensing in the system of FIG. 16 may be as describedwith regard to an earlier embodiment. As for the reflectivity sensing,an exemplary structure is illustrated in FIG. 17. Specifically, the card210 (illustrated fragmentarily) is moved transversely (to the right forexample) in relation to a light source 300 which may, for example,comprise a low-power infrared laser to provide a beam 302 that isreflected from the card 210 as illustrated. A fragmentary or reflectedbeam 306 is detected by a photocell 308 which provides a representativeanalog signal in a conductor 310. Note that in the plane of the drawingof FIG. 17, i.e. the plane defined by the light source 300, thephotocell 308 and the point of light incidence on the card 210 are atright angles to the motion of the card 210.

As the card 210 is effectively scanned by the beam 302, considerablevariation is imparted to the beam 306 in view of the sand-like particles226 which obscure the foil 224. As a consequence, a random measurablebut not practicably duplicable characteristic is provided.

In a refined embodiment of the structure of FIG. 17 the illustratedsystem is duplicated for dimensional sensing operation. Specifically, asecond transverse light source and photocell reflectivity reader areplaced with interchanged positional relationship to the source 300 andcell 308. In that manner, a single path is scanned from two differentdimensional viewpoints. Consequently, the dimensional path has a sensedcharacteristic that would be substantially immune from reproductionusing any known photographic or other techniques. Other reflectingtechniques, as backscattering may well be adopted for use in a system asdisclosed herein.

As suggested above, certain random measurable but not practicablyduplicable characteristics can be recorded at locations other than onthe card 210 for example. To consider a specific case involving a lownumber of important cards, translucency signals from predeterminedlocations on each card 210 might be placed in memory quite separate andapart from the operations explained and described above. With such data,a questioned card could be further confirmed. Such a technique might beemployed to combat unauthorized use of a proper card productionfacility.

In accordance herewith, a number of other measurable but not practicablyduplicable characteristics may be useful as the random data source. Inthat regard, paper smoothness, as well as the smoothness of othermaterials may be practical in a commercial system. Specifically, in thatregard, an apparatus is available from Measurex Corporation (Model 2205)which is a smoothness sensor adaptable for providing an electricalsignal indicative of a smoothness along a specific line of travel.

From the above descriptions, it can be appreciated that authenticatorsin accordance herewith can be variously produced, used and verified. Inthat regard, authenticators in the form of tags bearing a magneticstripe can be economically produced using roll stock techniques.Specifically, referring to FIG. 18, a reel 320 (left) supplies a roll322 of card stock to a take-up reel 324 which is driven by aconstant-speed motor 326. The roll 322 of card stock is perforated todefine separate authenticators or tags 328, each bearing a magneticrecording stripe 330.

In the operation of the system of FIG. 18, as the tags 328 continouslymove from the reel 320 to the reel 324, each is sensed and recorded.After a magnetic marker is recorded on a tag, translucency signals aresensed for the tag. Selected samples of the translucency signals arethen magnetically recorded on the tag, along with code designations toindicate the locations where the translucency signals were sensed. Thetags 328 may then be subsequently tested for authenticity by comparingobserved translucency patterns with the magnetically recorded values.

Considering the system of FIG. 18 in somewhat greater detail, tags 328from the reel 320 first move under a read-write magnetic transducer head334 which is coupled to a control computer 336. The head 334 senses eachmagnetic anomaly at the perforations between the tags 328 to provide asignal commanding the computer 336 to provide a signal for recording anindex bit or start marker on the magnetic stripe 330.

After passing under the head 334, the tags 328 move between a lightsource or lamp 336 and a bank of photocell sensors 338. For example, thebank of sensors 338 may comprise three sensors for sensing translucencyalong three tracks on the continuous roll of tags 328 in the form ofthree analog signals.

The computer 336 receives the three analog translucency signals from thesensors 338 and formulates select digital representations. For example,each of the three analog signals might be sampled at three distinctinstants to provide an aggregation of nine digital values.

The instants of sampling are related by the computer 336 to specificlocations on the associated tag 328. Thus, while the samples areconverted to representative digital formats, the locations from whichthey were sensed are defined in terms of offsets along the tag length.Such data is formulated into a representative code word before theassociated tag reaches a pair of magnetic transducer heads 340 and 342.

The head 340 senses the index bits recorded on the tags 328 by the head334 and thereby actuates the head 342 to record the code wordrepresentative of locations and values for a specific tag 328. Thedescription of a specific operating sequence with regard to one tag 328will summarize the operation of the system.

As each of the perforations separating a pair of tags 328 move under thehead 334, the anomaly is sensed indicating that a fresh tag 328 is aboutto move between the sensors 338 and the lamp 336. As such movementoccurs, analog translucency signals are provided to the computer in atime-space relationship with the tag 328 being observed. Such signalsare processed by the computer, specifically being sampled at selectlocations, and the samples converted to a digital form. Signalsdefinitive of the sampled locations are also developed in digital form.Accordingly, the digital signals indicate specific locations on the tag328 under consideration and the translucency at such locations. Arepresentative code word (encrypted) is then formed for recording on thestripe 330 of the tab 328.

When the tag 328 of concern reaches the heads 340 and 342, the recordedindex bit is sensed by the head 340 and the code word is then recordedby the head 342. Accordingly, each tag 328 is sensed and recorded as acompleted authenticator. Of course, as explained above, the tags 328 maycomprise labels or other authentication devices, to be verified asdescribed above.

With regard to types of authenticators, still another examplary formmight comprise any of a variety of financial paper. In that regard, itis common practice to print colored dots on checks and the like toincrease the burden of counterfeiting. The addition of techniques of thepresent invention to such media would greatly enhance the security ofsuch financial paper. To consider a specific process, reference will nowbe made to FIG. 19.

A fragment of paper 350 is illustrated (FIG. 19) which may be of bondquality and may comprise a portion of any of a variety of documentsimportant for authentication. The paper 350 carries printed dots 352that are of various colors and tend to bleed somewhat irregularly intothe texture of the paper. The pattern of the colored dots 352 may bequite irregular.

In addition to the colored dots 352, the paper 350 also carries engraveddots (only six of such dots are shown) specifically dots 354, 355, 356,357, 358 and 359 which may be black and are located to define arectangular array. The engraved dots are precise and cleanly defined.

Generally, the authenticator is used by selecting a path in relation tocertain of the engraved dots, e.g., a path 360 between the dots 354 and359. The measurable but not practicably duplicable characteristic isthen sensed along the path 360 to provide a signal that identifies thepaper 350. The path 360, as well as the observed analog signal may beregistered in an encrypted numeral 362. Accordingly, authentication ofthe paper 350 involves decoding the numeral 362, sensing the measurablebut not practicably duplicable characteristic along the path 360, thencomparing (at least in part) the sensed characteristic with the valuesregistered for that characteristic.

A document incorporating the paper 350 may carry a substantial number ofthe engraved dots, as dot 354, which are used as reference points tospecify paths, e.g., path 360. A system processing the document wouldkey onto the engraved dots to establish a reference position from whichthe selected path could be sensed. As indicated above, the path might beobserved for any of a variety of measurable but not practicablyduplicable characteristics, as translucency. As used herein (includinguse in the claims) the phrase "measurable but not practicably duplicablecharacteristic" means a characteristic that varies randomly fromauthenticator to authenticator, as opposed to a predetermined fixed orcoded pattern placed on each authenticator in a group.

As will be readily appreciated from the above illustrative embodiments,the system hereof is susceptible to a great number of modifications anddeviations within the basic conceptual framework. Accordingly, the scopehereof is deemed to be as set forth in the claims below.

What is claimed is:
 1. An authenticator device for verifyingauthenticity comprising:a sheet of medium haivng a varying randomtranslucency characteristic over an area of said sheet, saidcharacteristic being inherent in the composition of said medium;imprinted intelligence on said sheet positioned on at least a specificportion of said area; and machine-readable indicia on said sheet ofmedium, said indicia being decodable to specify the translucency of saidsheet at a location of said area including said specific position ofsaid area.
 2. An authenticator device according to claim 1 whereinindicia designates at least said specific portion of said area wherebyto detect modifications of said imprinted intelligence.
 3. Anauthenticator device for verifying authenticity comprising:a sheet ofmedium having a varying random transparency characteristic over an areaof said sheet, said characteristic being inherent in the composition ofsaid medium; and machine-readable indicia on said sheet of medium, saidindicia being decodable to indicate at least one specific area locationon said sheet at which the characteristic is to be measured and furtherto specify the characteristic of said sheet at said specific arealocation.
 4. an authenticator device for verifying authenticitycomprising:a sheet of medium having a varying random repeatablecharacteristic dimensional within the medium of said sheet and extendingover an area of said sheet, said characteristic being of a nature thatmay be sensed by passing radiation through said sheet at said area; andmachine-readable indicia on said sheet of medium, said indicia beingdecodable to indicate at least one specific area location on said sheetat which the characteristic is to be measured and further to specify thecharacteristic of said sheet for at least one specific area location. 5.An authenticator device for verifying authenticity comprising:a sheet ofmedium having a varying random repeatable characteristic over an area ofsaid sheet, said characteristic being in the form of dimensional depthreflectivity variations; and machine-readable indicia on said sheet ofmedium, said indicia being decodable to specify the characteristic ofsaid sheet at a specific area location.
 6. An authenticator according toclaim 5 wherein said machine-readable indicia further indicates at leastone specific area location on said sheet at which the characteristic isto be measured.
 7. An authenticator according to claim 5 wherein saidcharacteristic comprises the reflectivity of an array of sand-likeparticles on said sheet.
 8. An authenticator device according to claim 3comprising a medium of uniform-appearing composition.
 9. Anauthenticator device for verifying authenticity comprising:a sheet ofmedium; a reflective layer disposed on one side of said sheet over atleast a part of the area of said sheet; an array of sand-like particlesfixed on said reflective layer whereby to provide a varyingcharacteristic of light reflectivity over the space of said reflectivelayer; and machine-readable indicia on said sheet of medium, saidindicia being decodable to specify said characteristic at said specificarea location.
 10. An authenticator device of verifiable authenticityfor use with a subject of identification, comprising:a sheet of mediumhaving an anticounterfeit characteristic machine-readable to producerepresentative signals; and machine-readable indicia on said sheet ofmedium, said indicia being decodable to provide both data signalsidentified with said subject of identification and representativesignals for said anticounterfeit characteristic to verify authenticity.11. An autheticator device according to claim 10 wherein saidanticounterfeit characteristic is randomly generated.
 12. Anautheticator device according to claim 10 wherein said anticounterfeitcharacteristic is variable translucency over a part of said sheet. 13.An authenticator according to claim 10 wherein said machine-readableindicia on said sheet of medium further is decodable to providetime-related signals.
 14. An autheticator according to claim 10 whereinsaid data signals identified with said subject of identification includea numerical identification for said subject.
 15. An autheticatoraccording to claim 10 wherein said machine-readable indicia on saidsheet of medium further is decodable to provide coding data relating tosaid machine-readable indicia.
 16. A method for producing anautheticator device for an individual subject of identificationcomprising the steps of:selecting A sheet of medium for use in saiddevice, said sheet having a machine-readable anticounterfeitcharacteristic; sensing said characteristic of said sheet to providerepresentative electrical signals; providing miscellaneous dataelectrical signals identified with said individual subject ofidentification; and recording said representative electrical signals onsaid sheet of medium encoded along with said miscellaneous data signals.17. A method according to claim 16 wherein said step of sensing saidcharacteristic is to provide digital representative signals.
 18. Amethod according to claim 16 further including a step of recordingidentification data on said sheet of medium in human perceivable form.19. A method according to claim 16 wherein said step of sensing saidanticounterfeit characteristic is performed by irradiating said sheetwith light.
 20. A method of producing an autheticator device comprisingthe steps of:selecting a sheet of medium having a varying randomcharacteristic over an area of said sheet, said characteristic beinginherent in the composition of said medium; and specifying at least onelocation on said sheet as location data; measuring said characteristicat said specified location on said sheet as identification data; andfrom said identification data, recording on said sheet machine-readableindicia decodable to specify said characteristic of said sheet at saidlocation on said sheet.
 21. A verification method comprising the stepsof:selecting a sheet of medium having a varying random characteristic ofan area of said sheet, said characteristic being inherent in thecomposition of said medium; and specifying at least one location in saidarea as location data; measuring said characteristic at said specifiedlocation on said sheet as identification data; from said identificationdata, recording on said sheet machine-readable indicia decodable tospecify an indication of the measurement of said characteristic of saidsheet for at least said one specified location on said sheet;subsequently measuring said characteristic for at least said specifiedlocation on said sheet to provide confirmation data; and comparing saididentification data with said confirmation data to verify theauthenticity of said sheet.